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Compelled Speech and Doctrinal Fluidity
DAVID S. HAN*
Even within the messy and complicated confines of First Amendment jurisprudence,
compelled speech doctrine stands out in its complexity and conceptual murkiness—
a state of affairs that has only been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in
NIFLA v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees. This Essay observes that as the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence
has grown increasingly complex, it has also manifested a troubling degree of fluidity,
where the doctrinal framework has grown so incoherent, imprecise, and unstable
that it can be readily shaped by courts to plausibly justify a wide range of disparate
results. After examining some recent examples of this doctrinal fluidity and
identifying its origins, the Essay observes that a true fix to this problem—the
development of a fully coherent and stable compelled speech doctrine—is highly
unlikely to emerge under the current state of affairs, given the intractable nature of
the sources of this fluidity and the Court’s case-by-case, winner-take-all culture of
constitutional adjudication.
This Essay therefore argues for a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to
compelled speech doctrine—one that eschews formal complexity in favor of more
open-ended, analytically transparent approaches. This proposal is, in essence, a
second-best solution. If it is unrealistic to expect that an elegant, fully unified, and
consistent doctrinal framework will emerge anytime soon, the Court should, at the
very least, avoid obscuring its decisions behind complex and malleable formal
doctrines and instead analyze cases in a manner that lays bare the fundamental
intuitions and value judgments actually driving its decisions. A useful point of
comparison might be to common law courts’ approach to negligence doctrine—an
approach that is anchored in a simple, open-ended analysis that forces courts to
bring to the fore the fundamental values underlying the doctrine. Such an approach
would at least allow courts—and society at large—to discuss and debate these
fundamental values openly rather than through a nebulous doctrinal façade that may
ultimately serve merely to obscure the contested judgments and intuitions actually
driving the results.

* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law. Many thanks to the
participants of the Indiana Law Journal’s symposium on Compelled Speech: The Cutting
Edge of First Amendment Jurisprudence for their helpful comments and suggestions. All
errors and omissions are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
First Amendment doctrine is famously messy and complicated—a tangled web of
blurry doctrinal distinctions, inconsistently enforced rules, and open-ended tests.
Even against this backdrop, however, the Supreme Court’s compelled speech
doctrine stands out in its complexity and conceptual murkiness. In an article
published soon after the Court’s most recent compelled speech decisions in National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra and Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Eugene Volokh spent forty
pages painstakingly laying out and explaining a broad array of rules and exceptions
that, in his view, best capture the doctrine.1 Yet even this incredibly meticulous
treatment of the doctrine was bookended by a series of disclaimers. At the outset,
Volokh observed that “the doctrine contains major uncertainties” and that “its details
are hard to pin down.”2 He then concluded the article on an even blunter note,
observing that when it comes to compelled speech, one “must cope with a sneaking
feeling that there is no such thing as first principles, just one damned case after
another.”3
It therefore seems an appropriate moment to step back and evaluate the current
state of the doctrine. There is, of course, extensive academic literature as to whether
the Court’s various compelled speech decisions have gotten things substantively

1. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355 (2018).
2. Id. at 356–57.
3. Id. at 394.
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right.4 But this Essay addresses a different question: whether the manner in which
the Court has constructed—and continues to construct—compelled speech doctrine
is capable of producing the sort of predictability, constraint, and stability that are the
hallmarks of a sound doctrinal framework. It focuses specifically on the substantial
complexity that has developed within the doctrine since its relatively simple
beginnings nearly eighty years ago. While complexity can serve to bring greater
constraint, stability, and accuracy to the doctrine, it can also produce a state of
doctrinal fluidity, where the doctrinal framework becomes so destabilized,
incoherent, and opaque that it can be readily shaped by courts to plausibly justify a
wide range of disparate results. And the Court’s recent decisions suggest that the
complexity within the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence increasingly falls into
the latter category.
Part I of this Essay broadly examines the issue of doctrinal complexity and
evaluates the present complexity of compelled speech doctrine. It observes that as
the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence has grown increasingly complex, it has
also manifested a troubling degree of fluidity—that is, it has become so incoherent,
imprecise, and unstable that it affords courts significant flexibility to adopt, discard,
stretch, or contract rules at their pleasure. Part II examines the sources of this
doctrinal fluidity, tracing it primarily to two fundamental characteristics of modern
First Amendment jurisprudence: the lack of a singular and coherent theoretical
underpinning for protecting speech, and the rapid expansion of First Amendment
coverage to an increasingly wide and eclectic variety of communicative contexts.
Part III makes some observations as to what can be done to combat the problems
associated with doctrinal fluidity within compelled speech doctrine. It observes that
any true fix to the problem is highly unlikely, given the intractable nature of the
sources of this fluidity and the Court’s case-by-case, winner-take-all culture of
constitutional adjudication. Thus, if a fully coherent and stable compelled speech
doctrine is unlikely to emerge, perhaps the best we can hope for is a Court that
approaches cases in a manner that is analytically transparent—one that lays bare the
fundamental intuitions and value judgments upon which it is actually basing its
decisions in individual cases rather than obscuring them behind complex and
malleable doctrines. I therefore suggest that the Court’s approach to compelled
speech doctrine should emulate common law courts’ approach to negligence
doctrine—an approach that is marked by more direct and open-ended analyses that
bring to the fore the fundamental value judgments underlying the doctrine. Part IV
concludes.

4. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Speech and the Irrelevance of
Controversy, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 731 (2020); William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled
Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171 (2018); Robert Post, Compelled
Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195
(2005).
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I. DOCTRINAL COMPLEXITY AND FLUIDITY IN COMPELLED SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Complexity of Modern Compelled Speech Doctrine
Compelled speech doctrine originated in the 1943 case of West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.5 Barnette involved a constitutional challenge to a West
Virginia law requiring schoolchildren to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.6 In deeming the law unconstitutional, the Court famously observed, “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”7
From these relatively straightforward beginnings, compelled speech
jurisprudence has sprawled into a doctrine of great breadth and complexity,
extending well beyond the context of direct ideological speech compulsions. Over
the following eight decades, the doctrine has grappled with a wide variety of
government compulsions, such as mandatory factual disclosures in commercial
advertising,8 compelled subsidies of commercial speech,9 compelled hosting of
another’s speech on one’s property,10 and compelled incorporation of others’ speech
into one’s own speech.11 In each of these contexts, the Court has developed distinct
sets of doctrinal standards, many of which are replete with their own set of complex
rules, subrules, and exceptions.12
Exhaustively documenting the complexity of current compelled speech doctrine
is well beyond the scope of this Essay; as noted above, Eugene Volokh’s recent
attempt to summarize and explain the doctrine ran to forty pages. But the following
is just a sampling of the doctrinal distinctions the Court has developed within the
compelled speech context:
•
•
•

Whether a mandatory monetary assessment is used to subsidize the speech
of a private party or a government speaker13
Whether the government’s compulsion also works to restrict the speaker’s
own speech14
Whether the government’s compulsion works to misattribute the
compelled speech to the unwilling speaker15

5. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
6. Id. at 626–27.
7. Id. at 642.
8. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
9. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
10. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
12. See generally Volokh, supra note 1.
13. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005).
14. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 359–65 (describing this subset of cases and contrasting
their treatment to that of “pure speech compulsions” that do not restrict speech).
15. See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74; Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65
ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1299–1300 (2014) (discussing the significance of misattribution as an
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Whether the compulsion is purely factual as opposed to one based on
opinion16
Whether the compulsion involves ideological speech, commercial
advertising, or professional speech17
Whether a mandated factual disclosure is “uncontroversial”18
Whether the compulsion involves actual communication, or the provision
of money to subsidize speech, or the provision of one’s property to host
speech19

And as Volokh observed, despite the current complexity of the doctrine, there
continue to be numerous doctrinal details and uncertainties that the Court has yet to
resolve.20
B. The Benefits and Dangers of Complexity Within First Amendment Doctrine
What is the source of this steadily increasing complexity within compelled speech
doctrine? To a certain extent, this trend merely tracks the general development of
First Amendment jurisprudence as a whole.21 Commenting back in 1982 on the
Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in New York v. Ferber,22 Frederick Schauer
observed:
The rules relating to child pornography now take their place alongside
the equally distinct rules relating to obscenity, defamation, advocacy of
illegal conduct, invasion of privacy, fighting words, symbolic speech,
and offensive speech. Moreover, each of these areas contains its own
corpus of subrules, principles, categories, qualifications, and exceptions.
There are also special principles for particular contexts, such as
government employment, the public forum, and electronic broadcasting,

infringement of speaker autonomy).
16. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Corbin,
supra note 15, at 1286–89.
17. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (ideological speech);
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (commercial advertising); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (professional speech). But see Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs.
(NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (suggesting that professional speech is not
“a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles,” but declining
to foreclose that possibility completely).
18. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Alan K. Chen, Compelled
Speech and the Regulatory State, 97 IND. L.J. 881 (2022).
19. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (communication); United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (subsidizing speech); PruneYard, 447 U.S.
74 (hosting speech on one’s property).
20. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 357 (outlining some of the “major uncertainties” within
the doctrine, such as whether “requiring people to create speech . . . constitute[s] impermissible
speech compulsion”).
21. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616 (1991) (“The doctrinal web surrounding the free speech clause of the
first amendment is one of the most complicated and confusing in constitutional law.”).
22. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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and in addition we have the pervasive tools of First Amendment analysis,
such as chilling effect, prior restraint, vagueness, overbreadth, and the
least restrictive alternative. . . . When we take all of this together it
becomes clear that the First Amendment is becoming increasingly
intricate, which has prompted one scholar to observe pejoratively that
First Amendment doctrine is beginning to resemble the Internal Revenue
Code.23
First Amendment doctrine has, of course, grown only more complex over the decades
following Schauer’s observation.
There is a fundamental reason as to why First Amendment doctrine has developed
with this degree of complexity. The text of the Free Speech Clause itself—“Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”24—is incredibly sparse, yet
it also suggests a significant scope and breadth of protection.25 Furthermore, the
historical background surrounding its drafting offers little in the way of interpretive
guidance.26 This textually sparse but broad mandate—combined with the nearinfinite variety of factual scenarios potentially triggering First Amendment
protection—means that the edifice of First Amendment doctrine must ultimately be
designed and constructed by courts, brick by brick, through common law-style
development.27
And as Schauer has observed, we have now had a century’s worth of experience28
with all sorts of different First Amendment problems—experience that has allowed
us to discern patterns in disparate cases that enable us to craft legal rules and
categories governing discrete recurring circumstances. As a result, the “codification”
of the First Amendment, as Schauer calls it, makes eminent sense.29 There is little
reason to adhere to simple but vague First Amendment doctrines when experience
allows us to construct a more complex set of rules tailored for specific situations.30

23. Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 285, 308–09 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 309.
26. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET
& PAMELA S. KARLAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–7 (2d ed. 2003); Lawrence Rosenthal, First
Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free
Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 26–27 (2011) (observing, after undertaking a detailed historical survey,
that “the evidence regarding the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses is anything
but easy to sort out” and that “[i]n the face of such deeply conflicting evidence, most scholars
of the First Amendment have despaired of producing any coherent originalist account of the
Speech and Press Clauses”); see also id. at 29 (“[T]he difficulties in identifying the original
meaning of the First Amendment are a function of the reality that the meaning of free speech
and a free press was something of a moving target in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”).
27. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 309–10.
28. The modern era of First Amendment jurisprudence began with the Espionage Act
cases in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN YEARS 1 (1997); STONE ET AL., supra note 26, at 8 (observing that the Supreme
Court never directly considered the Free Speech Clause prior to the Espionage Act of 1917).
29. Schauer, supra note 23, at 309.
30. Id. at 310 (observing that “[t]he more we have seen, the less likely we are to be
surprised, and open-ended flexibility becomes progressively less important”).
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We have voluminous rules and subrules governing areas such as public forums,
obscenity, and defamation because we have, over time, developed sufficient
familiarity with these particular aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence to
construct bespoke doctrines. And if we end up with an intricate and complex
doctrinal framework, that is to a significant extent merely a reflection of the intricacy
and complexity of the broad mandate set forth by the First Amendment. The
development of doctrinal complexity is therefore largely inevitable in First
Amendment doctrine as a whole and compelled speech doctrine specifically.
There is a distinction, however, between healthy complexity and unhealthy
complexity, and this is to be evaluated based on the general characteristics of
effective doctrinal frameworks. Broadly speaking, the hallmarks of sound doctrine
are precision, predictability, internal coherence, stability, and accuracy.31 In the First
Amendment context, a sound doctrinal framework will effectively constrain and
channel courts’ analyses in a manner that is both consistent with the underlying
purposes of the constitutional provision and internally coherent. And it must exhibit
a sufficient degree of stability such that it can be consistently and predictably relied
upon by courts, legislators, or any other actors seeking to conform their actions to
constitutional strictures.32 Finally, a sound doctrinal framework will generally serve
to illuminate rather than obscure the theoretical commitments underlying the
extension of special constitutional protection to speech.33
The development of more complex and intricate First Amendment doctrines can
certainly work to advance these goals, as it allows for more nuance and precision in
constraining and channeling courts’ analyses.34 To be sure, a more complex doctrine
requires a greater investment from courts and regulators to understand and apply it,
and there is a point at which complexity may become so extreme as to be practically
inadministrable and counterproductive.35 But as long as courts and regulators are
capable of applying them, complex doctrinal frameworks can enhance the clarity,
predictability, and accuracy that are the hallmarks of effective doctrine. And when
these frameworks are well constructed, they can do so in a manner that illuminates
the first principles supporting the doctrinal framework below the surface.

31. See id. at 311 (observing that “First Amendment doctrine serves the normative
function of guiding future action”).
32. In this context, stability is a relative term. As noted above, First Amendment doctrine
necessarily evolves through common law-style development; if it were to remain completely
static, it would lose its capacity to adapt to the novel speech problems that constantly emerge
as a result of technological, cultural, and social change. See David S. Han, Constitutional
Rights and Technological Change, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 71, 120–21 (2020). And if the
doctrine does not evolve with these changes, it risks becoming obsolete, in that it will either
yield nonsensical results or devolve into meaningless window dressing. See id. at 105–13.
33. See David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359,
372–79 (2015).
34. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 316 (“Making First Amendment doctrine more precise
makes it easier both to decide cases and to predict the outcome of First Amendment
litigation.”).
35. See id. at 316 (observing that “[d]octrines can become so complex that they go beyond
the interpretive and comprehensive abilities of those who must apply them”).
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Take, for example, the law of defamation. The Court’s first foray into the area
was in New York Times v. Sullivan, a 1964 case where the Court held that public
official plaintiffs must prove actual malice in order to prevail on a defamation claim
regarding their official duties.36 Sullivan represented the starting point for what
would become a highly intricate doctrinal framework governing defamation
claims—a framework that the Court built out, piece by piece, over the following
decades. Over time, it crafted distinct standards for cases involving private figure
plaintiffs and statements regarding issues of private concern.37 It also delineated and
clarified a wide range of discrete issues within the defamation framework, such as
standards of review,38 the distinction between facts and opinions,39 the distinction
between public and private figures,40 allocation of the burden of proof,41 and so forth.
Defamation doctrine exhibits the sort of positive complexity that ultimately helps
to better effectuate the vaguely defined mandate of the First Amendment. It is the
natural outgrowth of the common law-style development of First Amendment
jurisprudence—a reflection of the many facets of defamation doctrine that revealed
themselves over time, on a case-by-case basis. Although scholars might disagree as
to the particularities of the doctrine, it is sufficiently coherent, as it was constructed
from the outset on a singular and robust theoretical foundation: the promotion of
democratic self-governance.42 It has also proven to be relatively stable—the basic
doctrinal framework has remained largely unchanged over the span of decades, with
the Supreme Court and lower court judges consistently working within its confines.
To the extent that there is imprecision in the doctrine—for example, distinguishing
public figures from private figures or determining whether a statement is on a matter
of public concern—it is the sort of imprecision that is largely unavoidable given the
nature of the doctrine. And finally, the complexities in the doctrine broadly serve to
highlight, rather than obscure, the sorts of value judgments underlying the doctrine.
Most notably, the greater constitutional protection afforded in cases involving public
figures and matters of public concern is a direct reflection of the doctrine’s theoretical
roots in a democratic self-governance theory of the First Amendment, as democratic
self-governance is most strongly implicated in these contexts.43
But doctrinal complexity can also work to opposite ends, producing a condition
of doctrinal fluidity. Doctrinally fluid frameworks are incoherent, imprecise, and

36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private figure plaintiffs); Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (issues of private
concern).
38. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
39. See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
40. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342–45.
41. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986).
42. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[W]e consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.”).
43. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
145 (1983).
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unstable; as such, they breed doctrinal gaps, inconsistencies, and ambiguities that
provide courts with the flexibility to adopt, discard, stretch, or contract rules at their
pleasure. And as Randy Kozel has observed, “[a] doctrine that is ill-defined or
excessively weak will lead not to constraint and predictability but to cynicism that
the law is being applied in good faith.”44
Under these circumstances, the doctrinal framework ceases to accomplish its
intended function. It fails to constrain courts’ decision-making to a meaningful
degree, it undermines courts’ and legislatures’ ability to consistently and predictably
rely upon it, and its openness and imprecision translates to little assurance of
accuracy (however one might define that term in a given dispute). The doctrine
instead becomes a shifting morass of ill-fitting rules and subrules—one that is easily
susceptible to cherry-picking or manipulation depending on the Court’s preferred
result. And when this sort of doctrinal fluidity exists, the complexity of the doctrine
often works to obscure rather than illuminate: doctrinal analyses may take on the
semblance of a ritual dance preceding a preordained result rather than a focused and
tailored inquiry premised on the theoretical and intuitional judgments actually
underlying courts’ decisions.45
A clear example of this sort of unhealthy complexity is the Court’s adoption of
the secondary effects doctrine in cases evaluating zoning restrictions on sexually
oriented businesses.46 In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, the Court dealt with a
zoning restriction that prohibited any “adult motion picture theater” from being
located in close proximity to residential housing, parks, churches, or schools47—an
ordinance clearly content-based on its face. Nevertheless, rather than apply the
doctrine in a straightforward manner by applying strict scrutiny, the Court deemed
the ordinance to be content-neutral (and thus subject only to intermediate scrutiny),
since the regulation “aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion
picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community,” with goals such as preventing crime, preserving property
values, and protecting retail trade.48
The secondary effects doctrine has been subject to withering criticism. Geoffrey
Stone, for example, called Renton “a disturbing, incoherent, and unsettling
precedent” that “threatens to undermine the very foundation of the contentbased/content-neutral distinction,” since—contrary to firmly established case law—

44. Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV.
105, 117 (2015).
45. My argument here therefore reflects the sort of skepticism of formal legal analysis
associated with the legal realism movement, although to a more limited degree. See, e.g., Felix
S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
821 (1935) (describing jurisprudence as “a special branch of the science of transcendental
nonsense,” as “legal concepts . . . do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of
faith”).
46. The following discussion draws from my previous work. See Han, supra note 33, at
409–10.
47. 475 U.S. 41, 44 (1986) (stating that the ordinance prohibited such theaters “from
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church,
or park, and within one mile of any school”).
48. Id. at 47–54.
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it allowed the government to escape strict scrutiny of content-based speech
restrictions by simply defending the restrictions with justifications unrelated to
communicative impact.49 Indeed, nearly all speech that the government seeks to
regulate carries harmful secondary consequences; it’s often because of these
consequences that the government seeks to regulate the speech in the first place.50
And a number of Justices have explicitly recognized the sleight-of-hand nature of the
doctrine; Justice Kennedy, for example, called the content-neutral characterization
of these sorts of zoning ordinances “something of a fiction,” observing that such
ordinances “are content based, and we should call them so.”51
The secondary effects doctrine thus increased the degree of doctrinal fluidity
within First Amendment doctrine. It introduced a doctrinal distinction that flew in
the face of previously established principles, thus undermining the coherence and
stability of the doctrine. And it did so in a way that obscured rather than illuminated
the fundamental reasons behind the Court’s decision. Broadly speaking, the Renton
Court likely adopted the doctrine in order to evade applying the onerous strict
scrutiny standard in a context where it seemed anomalous to do so. But the Court’s
most likely reason for doing so—a broad intuition that sexually explicit speech of
this sort is simply less valuable than, say, ideological speech52—had nothing to do
with the formal doctrinal justification for its result. Rather, in instituting the
incoherent secondary effects doctrine, it obscured the actual bases for its decision.
And in doing so, it imported into First Amendment jurisprudence a highly
troublesome doctrine, whose broad potential to cause substantial disruption has been
blunted only by the Court’s self-restraint in subsequent cases.53
C. Doctrinal Fluidity in Compelled Speech Doctrine
What, then, should we make of the growing complexity of compelled speech
doctrine? Is this a sign of healthy development toward an increasingly precise,
constrained, and accurate doctrinal framework? Or is it driving the doctrine toward
greater fluidity, where doctrinal analysis threatens to serve more as justificatory ritual
dance than as a true source of constraint and analytical clarity?

49. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 115–17
(1987).
50. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291,
307 (2009) (“Almost all speech with harmful direct effects also has negative downstream
consequences that are predictable. Indeed, it is typically because of the downstream social
consequences that government officials often wish to regulate dangerous speech.”).
51. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment).
52. See Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use
Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 95 (1988) (“Although the Court never explicitly
affirms the view that sexually explicit expression is a generally less valuable form of speech
. . . , no other explanation of Renton is plausible.”).
53. See Fee, supra note 50, at 304–05 (“The Court has never upheld a contentdiscriminatory regulation on the basis of the secondary effects doctrine that did not concern
sexually explicit speech.”).
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There is no singular answer to this question. Like in other areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence, the steadily increasing complexity of compelled speech
doctrine is, to a significant extent, the inevitable result of the broadened complexity
of the problems that it has come to encompass. As discussed above, the doctrine has,
over the past eighty years, extended well beyond the confines of Barnette; questions
regarding the constitutionality of, for example, mandated disclosures in commercial
advertising or compelled subsidies of private parties’ speech are far afield of direct
compulsions of ideological speech. So it is both natural and preferable that the Court
develop more precisely tailored doctrines to account for these sorts of distinctly
recurring fact patterns.
Yet as the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence has grown increasingly
complex, it has also manifested a troubling degree of malleability, instability, and
incoherence, particularly in its recent decisions.
1. Factual Disclosures by Medical Professionals
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,54 the Court
upheld a Pennsylvania law that required physicians or qualified nonphysicians to
make certain disclosures before they could perform an abortion. Among other things,
they were required to “inform the woman of the availability of printed materials
published by the State describing the fetus and providing information about medical
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list
of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion.”55
In upholding this requirement, the joint opinion characterized it as burdening speech
incidentally through the regulation of professional conduct.56 The opinion observed
that the requirement fit within the long established tort duty of doctors to obtain
informed consent to perform medical procedures, and as such, it should be regarded
as “part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation
by the State.”57
Nearly four decades later, in its 2018 decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, the Court
confronted a constitutional challenge to two California laws, one of which required
“licensed covered facilities” with the “primary purpose” of “providing family
planning or pregnancy related services” to disseminate a government-drafted notice
onsite.58 This “licensed notice” stated: “California has public programs that provide
immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion
for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the county social
services office at . . . .”59 The licensed notice was challenged by a number of crisis
pregnancy centers, which were described by the Court as “pro-life (largely Christian

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–69 (2018).
Id. at 2369.

5/5/22 2:58 PM

852

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:841

belief-based) organizations that offer a limited range of free pregnancy options,
counseling, and other services to individuals that visit a center.”60
Despite the close parallels between the mandatory disclosure in Casey and the
licensed notice in NIFLA, the Court distinguished them. Justice Thomas, writing for
the Court, emphasized that unlike in Casey—in which the disclosures were given in
conjunction with a specific medical procedure (abortion)—the licensed notice was
“not tied to a procedure at all.”61 As such, it could not fall into the broad rubric of
informed consent to a medical procedure, as no medical procedure may ever be
sought, offered, or performed with respect to the facility’s clients.62
But as Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, this distinction is not particularly
persuasive, as the content and context of the mandated disclosures in Casey and
NIFLA are virtually identical. The disclosures in NIFLA cover clinics in which
patients meet with “medical personnel engaging in activities that directly affect a
woman’s health”—personnel who are “licensed, certified or registered to provide
pregnancy-related medical services.”63 Carrying a child to term—which involves
extensive prenatal care—and giving birth involve medical procedures, just like
abortion.64 Thus, just as information about the possibility of adoption and childbirth
helps women make informed decisions as to having an abortion, information about
the possibility of abortion helps them make informed decisions about carrying a child
to term and giving birth. Indeed, as Enrique Armijo has observed, a pregnant woman
might have a viable tort claim for lack of informed consent under California law
based on a medical professional’s failure to discuss the option of abortion during
pregnancy counseling, particularly if risk factors are present.65
Furthermore, it seems plausible—if not likely—that this fairly hair-splitting
distinction did not, in actuality, carry much weight with respect to the actual
underlying basis for the Court’s decision in the case. Rather—as articulated directly
by the four-Justice concurrence66 and more indirectly in Justice Thomas’s
opinion67—the result seemed driven primarily by the Court’s sense that California
was engaging in impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination, requiring “primarily
pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the State’s own preferred message advertising
abortions.”68 But the Court’s analysis ultimately resulted in an additional doctrinal

60. Id. at 2368.
61. Id. at 2373.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2386.
65. Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1377,
1414–15 (2020). Furthermore, as Justice Breyer observed, it is not at all clear that informed
consent principles apply solely to discrete medical procedures. See 138 S. Ct. at 2386
(discussing warning labels on prescription drugs and required disclosures at breast cancer
screening clinics unrelated to the actual screening procedure).
66. See 138 S. Ct. at 2378–79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. See id. at 2375–76 (observing that most clinics “are excluded from the licensed notice
requirement without explanation” and noting that “[s]uch underclusiveness raises serious
doubts as to whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than
disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint”).
68. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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distinction that might either be marshaled again or shrunk to irrelevance in the future,
depending on what result the Court wants to reach.
2. Compelled Factual Disclosures in Commercial Advertising
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the
Court upheld a rule requiring lawyers who advertised their services on a contingencyfee basis to disclose that clients might be required to pay some fees and costs.69 In
doing so, the Court observed that “[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of
the information such speech provides, [the speaker’s] constitutionally protected
interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
minimal.”70 It therefore emphasized that “disclosure requirements trench much more
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech.”71 Although
the Court did “recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech,” it ultimately instituted a highly deferential standard for such mandatory
disclosures, requiring only that such disclosures “are reasonably related to the State’s
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”72
In NIFLA, the Court analyzed the application of Zauderer to a California statute
requiring “unlicensed covered facilities” to provide a notice on site and in all
advertising materials stating, “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the
State of California and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly
supervises the provision of services.”73 In doing so, however, the Court muddied
Zauderer’s highly deferential standard—one articulated with the standard language
of rational basis review—by transforming it into a far more searching inquiry. It
characterized California’s justification for the requirement as “purely
hypothetical,”74 despite the obvious connection between preventing deception and
informing customers of the licensing status of unlicensed covered facilities, which
“collect health information, perform obstetric ultrasounds or sonograms, diagnose
pregnancy, and provide counseling about pregnancy options or other prenatal care.”75
Furthermore, it readily construed California’s decision to extend the notice
requirement specifically to facilities providing pregnancy-related services as suspect,
rather than deferring to California’s stated goal to ensure that “pregnant women in
California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals.”76
The Court’s analysis therefore appeared to ratchet up what had long been framed
as a highly deferential standard—and treated as such in lower courts77—into one

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
2009)
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NIFLA. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369–70, 2377–78 (2018).
Id. at 2377.
Id. at 2390 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2370.
See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir.
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more akin to intermediate scrutiny.78 And this sort of abrupt shift destabilizes the
doctrine, as it opens up the possibility, in future cases, of the Court selecting between
two versions of Zauderer: the highly deferential, forgiving standard initially
articulated, or the more stringent, intermediate scrutiny-style standard applied in
NIFLA. Thus, rather than constrain the Court’s analysis, the untethered Zauderer
standard might simply serve as a convenient doctrinal justification for whatever
result the Court may want to reach in future cases.
3. Assessment of Agency Fees from Non-Union Public Employees
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court evaluated the constitutionality
of a Michigan law permitting “agency shop” agreements between local government
employers and unions in which non-union public employees are required to pay fees
to the union as a condition of employment.79 Emphasizing the significant government
interest in promoting labor peace—specifically, avoiding the conflict and disruption
inherent in dealing with multiple employee unions—and counteracting the problem
of “free rider” employees partaking in the benefits of union representation without
paying their fair share,80 the Court upheld the assessments insofar as they were “used
to finance expenditures by the Union for the purposes of collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”81
Over forty years later, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, overruled Abood,
holding that the mandatory collection of these agency fees from non-union public
employees “violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to
subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”82 After criticizing
Abood on substantive grounds, the Court ran through the traditional factors
governing whether the Court should overrule a past decision. In relevant part, it
argued that Abood was unworkable because its “line between chargeable and
unchargeable union expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw with

information’ are subject to the rational basis test”); Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech disclosure
requirement fits within the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a rationalbasis standard.”); Andra Lim, Note, Limiting NIFLA, 72 STAN. L. REV. 127, 136 (2020)
(observing that “[t]hroughout much of Zauderer’s lifespan, courts generally applied the test
deferentially”).
78. See Lim, supra note 77, at 141 (observing that the Court “applied Zauderer critically
rather than deferentially, as though it were an intermediate scrutiny test, not a rational basis
test”).
79. 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977).
80. Id. at 220–22.
81. Id. at 225–26. The Court, however, held that to the extent the union spent funds “for
the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement
of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative,”
such expenditures must be financed “from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their
will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.” Id. at 235–36.
82. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018).
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precision.”83 It also argued that although unions and government employers had
relied upon the availability of agency fee arrangements, such reliance did not carry
“decisive weight,” emphasizing that “public-sector unions have been on notice for
years regarding [the] Court’s misgivings about Abood.”84 In raising this argument,
the Court relied heavily on its decisions in Knox v. Service Employees International
Union85 and Harris v. Quinn86—cases dating from 2012 and 2014, respectively.
In dissent, Justice Kagan heavily criticized what she deemed to be a major
subversion of stare decisis principles. She observed that numerous Supreme Court
cases had, over the past four decades, cited Abood favorably and relied upon its
reasoning.87 She also criticized the Court’s heavy reliance on Knox and Harris in its
stare decisis analysis, observing that the Court was effectively bootstrapping—
setting the table for overruling Abood by “throw[ing] some gratuitous criticisms into
a couple of opinions and a few years later point[ing] to them as ‘special
justifications.’”88 Furthermore, she noted that any sort of line-drawing difficulties
involved in distinguishing between a union’s collective-bargaining activities and
political activities are par for the course within constitutional law doctrine, observing
that while there may of course be disagreement on a case-by-case basis, no broad
division existed within the circuit courts as to the contours and application of the
analysis.89 Finally, she highlighted the extensive reliance on Abood evinced by state
employers and unions, noting that over twenty states had enacted agency fee
provisions and “thousands of current contracts covering millions of workers provide
for agency fees.”90 She therefore concluded that the Court had “trivialize[d] stare
decisis” by “overthrow[ing] a decision entrenched in this Nation’s law—and in its
economic life—for 40 years.”91
However one might feel about the merits of the substantive arguments on both
sides, it is difficult to dispute much of Justice Kagan’s scathing critique of the Court’s
stare decisis analysis. Abood was a forty-year-old decision that had long been heavily
relied upon by state employers and unions. It didn’t appear to be particularly
unworkable—or, more precisely, it didn’t appear to be any less workable than
countless other aspects of First Amendment doctrine, which is replete with blurry
lines and fuzzy distinctions.
And Justice Kagan’s characterization of the majority’s approach as
“bootstrapping” seems apt given the circumstances. Knox and Harris—the two
decisions that “began the assault on Abood”92—had been decided only six and four
years prior to Janus, respectively; the Court’s opinions in both cases were written by

83. Id. at 2481.
84. Id. at 2484–86.
85. 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
86. 573 U.S. 616 (2014); see Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484–85.
87. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2498.
89. Id. at 2498–99; see also id. at 2499 (“If the kind of hand-wringing about blurry lines
that the majority offers were enough to justify breaking with precedent, we might have to
discard whole volumes of the U.S. Reports.”).
90. Id. at 2499.
91. Id. at 2501.
92. Id. at 2498.
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Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas; and both strongly indicated that Abood should be overruled. Indeed, it was
expected by many that the same majority would formally overrule Abood in the 2016
case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,93 but Justice Scalia’s untimely
death would instead lead to a summary affirmance by an equally divided Court.94
Given the subsequent appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, and given
the close connection between Justices’ votes in this context and their broad
ideological proclivities, the result in Janus was largely preordained by a simple count
of the votes, with the table being set for overruling a stable forty-year-old precedent
merely six years earlier by a portion of the Court that had quite openly targeted Abood
from the outset.
All of this, of course, only serves to magnify the instability of the doctrinal
framework. Stare decisis serves as a foundation for doctrinal stability, and as Randy
Kozel has observed, a weak system of stare decisis is “little better than none at all,”
because rather than breed “confidence that judges are acting as part of a unified
judiciary, appeals to stare decisis will breed suspicion of rhetorical cover in service
of individual agendas.”95
The Janus Court’s overruling of Abood in the manner that it did ultimately
highlights an aspect of the Court’s present culture that is a significant driver of
doctrinal fluidity—a broad understanding that in the end, five votes are what
ultimately matters, and achieving “correctness” in a given case should be prioritized
despite the effects such a decision might have on the broad coherence, stability, or
precision of the doctrine.96 Indeed, the Janus Court criticized the idea that
government employers and unions would rely on Abood—a squarely established,
unabandoned holding of the Court—stating instead that they should have seen the
writing on the wall after Knox and Harris.97 Such a posture only serves to reinforce
a broad perception of the doctrinal framework as problematically fluid and
malleable—one that is marshaled more as post-hoc justification of a desired result

93. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seems Poised to Deal Unions a Major
Setback, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/us/politics/atsupreme-court-public-unions-face-possible-major-setback.html
[https://perma.cc/4S6PA278] (observing that “the court’s conservative majority seemed ready to say that forcing
public workers to support unions they have declined to join violates the First Amendment”).
94. Friedrichs v. Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.).
95. See Kozel, supra note 44, at 117.
96. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme
Court, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 121, 131 (“As long as there are available in the decisional toolbox
of the Justices multiple ways of rationalizing the avoidance of a seemingly applicable previous
decision, the existence of that decision seldom stands as a significant barrier to what seems
now to the Court or to individual Justices as the better decision to make, precedent aside, for
the case before them.”); Charles Fried, Not Conservative, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (July 3, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/not-conservative/
[https://perma.cc/S25L-7NY5]
(observing that the Roberts Court “has undermined or overturned precedents that embodied
longstanding and difficult compromise settlements of sharply opposed interests and
principles”).
97. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2484–85 (2018); see also id. at 2500–01 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s
position as a “radically wrong understanding of how stare decisis operates”).
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rather than as a means of constraining and channeling courts’ analyses in an
appropriate and predictable manner.
* * *
To be clear, the purpose of my discussion here is not to argue whether the Court’s
decisions in any of these cases were substantively correct. Rather, it is to highlight a
complex doctrinal framework that, in light of the Court’s recent decisions,
increasingly exhibits a worrying degree of instability, malleability, and obscurity.
II. THE SOURCES OF INSTABILITY WITHIN COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
What is the ultimate source of this malleability and instability within compelled
speech doctrine? As noted above, some of this may be attributed to the culture of
Supreme Court decision-making; steady, predictable, and coherent doctrine will
necessarily be more difficult to build to the extent that the Court institutionally
prioritizes “correctness” on a case-by-case basis over doctrinal stability and integrity.
But the openness and fluidity of compelled speech doctrine are also rooted in two
fundamental characteristics of modern First Amendment jurisprudence: the lack of a
singular and coherent theoretical underpinning for the protection of speech, and the
rapid expansion of First Amendment coverage to a wide and eclectic variety of
communicative contexts. I will walk through each of these in turn.
A. The Lack of a Singular Theoretical Basis for Protecting Speech98
At the theoretical core of the Free Speech Clause is the basic idea that speech is
entitled to greater protection from government regulation than non-speech conduct.99
If this were not the case, of course, then the provision would be meaningless. Thus,
First Amendment doctrine fundamentally rests on the broad theoretical rationales as
to why speech is entitled to this special degree of protection; it is these rationales that
ultimately drive determinations regarding the breadth and degree of First
Amendment protection. As noted above, however, neither the sparse text of the Free
Speech Clause nor the historical background surrounding its drafting provide much
useful guidance in elucidating these background rationales. Thus, at least as a
practical matter, First Amendment doctrine is largely driven by courts’ underlying
intuitions as to what exactly makes speech valuable, and these intuitions are the
product of the particular theory or theories of speech protection adopted by the
courts.100

98. Portions of my discussion in this section draw from my previous work. See David S.
Han, Middle-Value Speech, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 72–74 (2017).
99. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8 (1982)
(“When there is a Free Speech Principle, a limitation of speech requires a stronger justification,
or establishes a higher threshold, for limitations of speech than for limitations of other forms
of conduct. This is so even if the consequences of the speech are as great as the consequences
of other forms of conduct.”).
100. See Han, supra note 33, at 364–67; Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 251 (1982) (observing that speech value
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Although many theoretical bases for granting special constitutional protection to
speech have been proposed, four particular rationales have dominated both the
academic and judicial discourse. The first is the idea that unfettered speech has
special value as a means of uncovering truth,101 an idea famously encapsulated by
Justice Holmes's statement that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”102 The second is the idea that
unfettered speech is necessary for democratic self-governance; if the citizens in a
democracy are the ultimate sovereigns, they must have the freedom to openly debate
and discuss matters of public concern to govern themselves effectively.103 The third
is the idea that freedom of speech is an essential aspect of individual autonomy and
personhood, and thus represents a good in itself, since “[o]ur ability to deliberate, to
reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those conclusions is the foundation
of our status as free and rational persons.”104 And a final theoretical rationale for
protecting speech is to check government abuse in managing public discourse.105
That is, the reason to protect speech might have less to do with the value produced
by such speech and more to do with the significant harm potentially caused by
government intervention in the marketplace of ideas.106
The Court, however, has not settled on any single rationale as the definitive
theoretical basis for protecting speech. Rather, it has adopted a patchwork approach,
recognizing these and other theoretical rationales in different contexts.107 This has

judgments “will vary with the substantive values one believes underlie the amendment”).
101. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
102. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 22–27 (1948); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA.
L. REV. 477, 482 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497–98 (2011).
104. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992); see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213–15 (1972).
105. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that “First
Amendment law . . . has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper
governmental motives”); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2
AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 521, 529 (1977).
106. See Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 761, 782 (1986) (describing “negative” theories of free speech that “stress[ ] the
harmful consequences of regulating speech rather than its intrinsic value”).
107. See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1983) (observing that
“the Court has been unwilling to confine the first amendment to a single value or even to a
few values”). But see Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1015, 1042–44 (arguing that the three traditional rationales are in fact components of a broader
theory conceptualizing the First Amendment “as an essential component of a nation whose
primary purpose is the protection of individual rights for the common good”).
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produced a First Amendment doctrine that is often theoretically muddled,108 in which
different speech values may overlap and conflict in particular contexts. Take, for
example, the issue of hate speech. On the one hand, extending constitutional
protection to hate speech might be said to protect individual autonomy, in the sense
of promoting both the speaker’s right to self-expression and listeners’ right to hear
all ideas;109 on the other hand, it may also degrade the ability of others to partake
freely in democratic self-governance.110 Similarly, direct government regulation of
the marketplace of ideas—such as the regulation of fake news or the imposition of
right-of-reply laws—might be a highly effective means of creating a healthier and
more robust public discourse, yet such regulation would also be antithetical to the
highly anti-paternalist conception of the First Amendment as a check on government
abuse.111
This broad theoretical instability is magnified in the context of compelled speech
doctrine due to the special importance of autonomy-based theories of speech
protection within the doctrine. In the more typical speech restriction context,
autonomy-based theories tend to be overshadowed by more robust instrumental
considerations, such as the pursuit of truth or democratic self-governance.112 As
Richard Fallon has observed, “autonomy-based arguments seem unlikely to possess
clear and uniquely determining power in very many [First Amendment] contexts,”
since “the influence of autonomy would occur mostly in the background, not the
foreground, and a number of competing values are likely to be in play.”113
With respect to compelled speech, however, autonomy-based rationales take on
special prominence. Unlike most speech restriction contexts, certain compelled
speech contexts—like pure, stand-alone speech compulsions that do not otherwise

108. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech is Not “Speech”, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 842
(2017) (“The truth is that for the past century, courts muddled through difficult free speech
issues because they had no theoretical basis for resolving such foundational questions, and
because they could do so without creating unacceptable social harms.”).
109. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 104, at 249–50.
110. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP.
U. L. REV. 281, 287–88 (1995) (arguing that hate speech “discourages [people] from
participating in the deliberative activities of society”); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 471–72 (arguing that
“racist speech decreases the total amount of speech that reaches the market” because it silences
those affected by it).
111. See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2370 (2000) (“In contexts ranging from restrictions
on pornography and hate speech to ‘right-of-reply’ statutes applicable to newspapers,
contemporary advocates of the Meiklejohnian position have sharply and continuously
complained of the tendency of courts to extend constitutional protection to individual rights
even when the exercise of such rights ‘distorts’ public discussion by perpetuating imbalances
of social and economic power.”).
112. See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Toward a More Explicit, Independent,
Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2020)
(observing that “with regard to most of the conventional doctrinal rules, instrumental values
dominate, and dignitary values are simply of secondary importance”).
113. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 905 (1994).
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interfere with speakers’ ability to say what they want114—do not strongly implicate
any of the instrumental rationales for protecting speech.115 Rather, they primarily
conflict with the broadly held intuition that forcing individuals to speak (or support
speech) against their will represents a special effrontery to human dignity and
autonomy that extends beyond merely preventing them from speaking. As Vikram
Amar and Alan Brownstein noted, “Even when there is no misattribution, . . . there
is something uniquely personal about speech that renders coerced communication an
intrusion into personal autonomy.”116 Thus, whereas instrumental rationales tend to
dominate in traditional First Amendment doctrine, “[t]his ordering is inverted when
it comes to compelled speech.”117
But unlike narrower, instrumental theories of speech protection—like the
promotion of democratic self-governance—autonomy-based rationales are
notoriously open-ended,118 simply because “[a]rguably all human conduct, beyond
speech, can be characterized as playing an important role in each person’s project of
self-[realization].”119 This reflects the general critique leveled by Robert Bork and
others against autonomy-based theories: because one can characterize all human
conduct, not just speech, as advancing individual autonomy, such an interest cannot
justify protecting speech to a degree greater than any other conduct.120
The prominence of autonomy-based rationales in compelled speech doctrine
therefore presents special problems in crafting a stable doctrinal framework. The
crux of many compelled speech cases is simply that people ought not be forced to
speak or support speech in an inauthentic manner.121 But we are, of course, required
by the government to say things we may prefer not to say all the time: we must report
our income on our tax returns; doctors are required to obtain informed consent from
patients before medical procedures; companies are required to make regulatory
disclosures in a wide variety of contexts. Autonomy-based theories generally fail to
provide a stable basis for extending greater protection to speech as opposed to non-

114. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 701 (1977) (deeming the required display of
the “Live Free or Die” state motto on a New Hampshire driver’s license plate
unconstitutional); Volokh, supra note 1, at 368–70 (describing this subset of cases).
115. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 112, at 21–22; Volokh, supra note 1, at 368.
116. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 112, at 22.
117. Id. at 21.
118. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 113, at 905 (“[A]utonomy-based arguments seem
unlikely to possess clear and uniquely determining power in very many contexts.”).
119. David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 98 n.145 (2012).
120. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (rejecting the argument that speech deserves special protection
because of its ability to promote self-development, since other activities can also achieve this
objective); Post, supra note 103, at 479–80 (finding autonomy-based rationales unpersuasive
because “the value of autonomy extends not merely to the speech of persons but also to the
actions of persons”). But see Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 598–601 (1982) (arguing that Bork’s view of the First Amendment is vulnerable to a
similar critique and challenging “Bork’s assumption that any principled first amendment
theory must rely solely on values that are uniquely protected by speech”).
121. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 112, at 22.
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speech conduct, let alone a stable basis for distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible speech compulsions.
Autonomy-based rationales in the compelled speech context are further muddied
by the question of whose autonomy is at stake in a given circumstance—is it that of
the speaker or that of the listener?122 Take, for example, the issue of compelled
disclosures in professional settings, like those imposed in Casey and NIFLA. On the
one hand, a speaker-based view of autonomy would hold that the speaker cannot be
forced to say something that she does not want to say, which would be an effrontery
to her basic human dignity. On the other hand, a listener-based view of autonomy
would hold that listeners are entitled to truthful, factual information that is necessary
for them to make their own decisions. To withhold such information would be to
blunt listeners’ capacity for self-realization—to limit their capacity “to deliberate, to
reach conclusions about [their] good, and to act on those conclusions,” which is “the
foundation of our status as free and rational persons.”123
The muddiness of compelled speech doctrine can therefore be traced, to a
significant extent, to both the unstable theoretical foundations of First Amendment
doctrine in general and to compelled speech doctrine’s strong reliance on autonomybased rationales for speech protection. The lack of any strong theoretical tether
underlying the Court’s decisions in individual cases translates to a broad fluidity in
the doctrinal options available to the Court in any given case. Broad assertions of
speaker autonomy can reliably be marshalled to strike down a wide variety of
government compulsions with little limit. On the other hand, broad assertions of
listener autonomy, broad assertions of the government’s general regulatory power,
or narrow constructions of the speech-conduct distinction can reliably point the Court
toward upholding a variety of government compulsions. This lack of a firm
theoretical foundation thus establishes the conditions for the doctrinal incoherence,
uncertainty, and instability within the doctrine, as this theoretical openness does little
to constrain the Court from pushing the doctrine in whatever direction it pleases.
B. The Rapid Expansion of First Amendment Coverage
A second feature of modern First Amendment jurisprudence that has contributed
to this doctrinal fluidity is the rapid expansion of the First Amendment’s coverage
over the past few decades.124 As many have observed, the story of modern First
Amendment doctrine is a story of steady and rapid expansion.125 As Lillian BeVier
has noted, “[b]efore the Court's extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech in 1976, the overwhelming majority of First Amendment cases

122. See Corbin, supra note 15, at 1298–1308 (distinguishing the speaker’s autonomy to
“ensur[e] that the individual rather than the government controls what she says and what she
thinks” from listeners’ autonomy, which is premised on the idea “that the government should
not be deciding what information audiences can or cannot access”).
123. See Fried, supra note 104, at 233.
124. Portions of this section draw from my previous work. See Han, supra note 98, at 92–
94.
125. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1199 (2015); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2015).
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involved attempts to regulate speech that was in one way or another speech about
government.”126 The first cases of the modern First Amendment era dealt with
textbook examples of political dissent,127 and many of the doctrinal cornerstones of
First Amendment jurisprudence—most notably, the bedrock rule that all contentbased speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny—can be traced back to a
handful of seminal cases dealing with political or otherwise ideological speech in
some form.128
In the intervening years, however, the coverage of the First Amendment has
expanded rapidly, far beyond the narrow confines of ideological speech within which
the foundations of First Amendment doctrine were developed. Beyond the Court’s
most notable expansion of First Amendment protection to commercial speech,129 it
has extended protection to a wide variety of other speech or speech-related activities,
such as false statements of fact,130 violent video games,131 sexually explicit speech,132
and the distribution of consumer data.133 And lower courts have extended First
Amendment protection to, for example, search engine results,134 computer code,135
scientific and technical details,136 professional speech,137 and factual instructions for
illegal or dangerous activities.138
Many of these forms of expression are far afield from core ideological speech.
And the fundamental questions as to whether each of these forms of expression ought
to be covered by the First Amendment—and, if so, the degree to which protection

126. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at
the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1287 (2005) (citation omitted).
127. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
128. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); BeVier, supra note
126, at 1287–88 (observing that prior to 1976, the “overwhelming majority of First
Amendment cases” dealt with government regulations that “generally concerned either speech
specifically about candidates or officials, speech about issues on the public agenda, or speech
generally criticizing our form of government and advocating its overthrow”).
129. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
130. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (plurality opinion).
131. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
132. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (observing that “nude
dancing . . . is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment”).
133. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
134. See, e.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
135. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because computer
source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer
programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment.”).
136. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 19–25 (2012) (describing the treatment of such speech amongst courts, with some
treating it as fully protected).
137. See, e.g., Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013).
138. See Bhagwat, supra note 136, at 15–19 (highlighting the “inconsistency and
contradictions” in courts’ treatments of these cases).
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should extend—are premised on theoretical considerations that are distinct from
those governing core ideological expression or other areas of First Amendment
coverage. The underlying theoretical rationales for protecting, say, search engine
results differ from the traditional rationales for protecting core ideological
expression, or the rationales for protecting professional speech, autobiographical lies,
or computer code.
This rapid expansion of First Amendment coverage can therefore be viewed as a
natural outgrowth of the theoretical instability at the root of First Amendment
doctrine. Without a singular, narrow theoretical basis for protecting speech—one that
can meaningfully both circumscribe and guide the contours of First Amendment
doctrine as they are developed—the Court is free to expand First Amendment
coverage well beyond the traditional confines of ideological speech into varied
communicative contexts that bear little resemblance to, say, speeches at rallies,
picketing, or political leafletting.
This rapid expansion has worked to destabilize First Amendment doctrine in two
different but connected ways. First, it has put significant pressure on what is perhaps
the single murkiest aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence: when regulated
activities constitute speech subject to special First Amendment treatment or nonspeech conduct that falls outside of the First Amendment’s boundaries. Second, the
extension of the First Amendment’s coverage to a broad and eclectic variety of
speech contexts has produced significant tension with the traditional First
Amendment doctrinal framework—one that was formulated with a much narrower
First Amendment in mind.
1. The Unsettled Nature of the Speech-Conduct Distinction
As noted above, the Free Speech Clause, at its root, represents a constitutionally
enshrined intuition that speech has special value—beyond that of other types of
conduct—such that it is entitled to a special degree of protection against government
regulation. Thus, the First Amendment requires that even when speech causes the
same (or greater) degree of social harm as non-speech conduct, it is nevertheless
entitled to more stringent protection, such as higher thresholds for proffered
government justifications and precision in regulatory design.139 As such, the question
as to what falls within the coverage of the First Amendment—that is, what constitutes
“speech” (or “freedom of speech”) for First Amendment purposes—lies at the very
core of First Amendment jurisprudence.
It is therefore peculiar, to say the least, that the speech-conduct distinction remains
one of the least doctrinally developed areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court’s sole attempt to construct a doctrinal standard to distinguish protected speech
from non-protected conduct came in Spence v. Washington.140 In Spence, a college
student was convicted for “improper use” of the American flag when he affixed a
peace symbol on a flag and hung the flag upside down from the window of his
apartment.141 In deeming the student’s actions speech protected under the First

139. See SCHAUER, supra note 99, at 8.
140. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
141. Id. at 406–07.
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Amendment, the Court noted that “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message
was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”142 The Court would later
clarify in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.
that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection,” as under this condition such protection “would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg,
or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”143
As many have noted, the Spence test simply does not work as a meaningful basis
for distinguishing protected speech from unprotected conduct.144 If, as the Court has
suggested, the sole requirements of the test are that the conduct must be “intended to
be communicative” and that it “would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be
communicative,”145 then it is far too broad, as there are countless examples of
communicative conduct meeting these criteria that clearly do not trigger First
Amendment scrutiny, such as political assassination, targeted vandalism, securities
transactions, or aeronautical navigation charts.146
Apart from the wholly lacking Spence test, the Court has done little to clarify the
speech-conduct distinction. And this is likely because—despite the apparently
straightforward, binary nature of the inquiry—the distinction is too complex a matter
to reduce easily to doctrine. As Geoffrey Stone has observed, First Amendment
doctrine tends to be developed backwards, where intuited results drive doctrine rather
than vice-versa.147 And the various intuitional factors underlying the speech-conduct
distinction are far more multifaceted and complex than they may initially appear.
These factors include the inherent characteristics of the activity in question, the social
context of the activity, and the government’s motive in instituting the relevant
regulation.
The most apparently self-evident factor in determining the coverage of the First
Amendment is the fundamental nature of the activity in question. Indeed, given the
straightforward text of the provision, one might presume that distinguishing
protected speech from non-speech conduct merely requires evaluating certain
inherent characteristics of the activity that, in the abstract, render it “speech” covered
by the First Amendment or unprotected conduct. The Spence test represents such an

142. Id. at 410–11; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294
(1984) (“[A] message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and
that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.”).
143. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
144. See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1250–60 (1995).
145. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
146. See Post, supra note 144, at 1254 (“Navigation charts for airplanes . . . are clearly
media in which speakers successfully communicate particularized messages. And yet when
inaccurate charts cause accidents, courts do not conceptualize suits against the charts’ authors
as raising First Amendment questions.”).
147. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 276 (2009) (“[W]e built First Amendment doctrine
backwards—not from theory to doctrine to results, but from intuited results to doctrine, with
only passing attention to theory.”).
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attempt to define speech as an abstract, freestanding concept based solely on these
sorts of fundamental characteristics.
But the shortcomings of attempts to define speech solely in this manner are readily
apparent. As Robert Post has observed, it is simply incorrect that “speech can be a
generic object of constitutional protection,” because under our eclectic First
Amendment jurisprudence, there cannot be a singular, abstract definition of
“speech.”148 And the “speech” referred to in the text of the First Amendment certainly
does not mean “speech” in the dictionary sense. As Frederick Schauer has noted,
contractual agreements and price fixing schemes are accomplished by “speech” in
the generic sense, but no court would find that large swaths of contract law and
antitrust law fall within the ambit of First Amendment coverage.149 Thus, “speech”—
or perhaps more accurately, “the freedom of speech”—cannot refer solely to some
freestanding conception of speech as such. It must refer to a particular subset of
communicative activity that corresponds to the underlying theoretical reasons as to
why speech is entitled to special constitutional protection.150
Because there is no generic notion of “speech” with generic constitutional value,
First Amendment coverage questions must also take the particular social context into
consideration. As Post stated, “the basic unit of First Amendment analysis” is not
speech as such, but rather “the constitutional values allocated to the discrete forms
of social practice that speech makes possible.”151 Furthermore, independent from
inherent characteristics of the activity in question and the social context surrounding
it, the government’s motive in regulating the activity plays a significant role in
determining whether the First Amendment is implicated,152 as the Court has
recognized in its expressive conduct jurisprudence.153 Indeed, in Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, the Court held that the First Amendment can be implicated even when the
purported speaker never actually “spoke,” provided that the government’s motives
and actions produced a constitutionally meaningful harm.154

148. Post, supra note 144, at 1271–72.
149. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1777–84 (2004).
150. See Post, supra note 144, at 1255 (“First Amendment analysis is relevant only when
the values served by the First Amendment are implicated. These values do not attach to
abstract acts of communication as such, but rather to the social contexts that envelop and give
constitutional significance to acts of communication.”).
151. Id. at 1273–74. As Post observes, a urinal cannot be deemed “speech” protected by
the First Amendment in and of itself, but a urinal presented by Marcel Duchamp as a sculpture
submitted to an art exhibition is transformed into protected speech. The surrounding social
context imbues the particular communicative medium with constitutional meaning. See id. at
1253–54.
152. See id. at 1255–56 (“[O]ur First Amendment jurisprudence is concerned not merely
with what is regulated, but also with why the state seeks to impose regulations.”).
153. Within the Court’s expressive conduct jurisprudence, the degree of First Amendment
protection rests on whether the governmental interest behind the regulation “is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). As the
Court in Texas v. Johnson stated, while “[t]he government generally has a freer hand in
restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word,” it cannot
“proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements.” 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
154. 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (observing that, in a case where a public employee was
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The destabilizing effect of the undeveloped speech-conduct distinction—when
combined with the rapid expansion of First Amendment coverage—is readily
apparent. With no meaningful doctrinal or theoretical boundaries to govern the
coverage analysis, litigants and courts are free to constantly push the boundaries of
the First Amendment outwards. As Schauer has observed, recent cases have evinced
“an accelerating attempt to widen the scope of First Amendment coverage to include
actions and events traditionally thought to be far removed from any plausible
conception of the purposes of a principle of free speech”155—a trend perhaps driven
by the unique magnetism and attractiveness of First Amendment arguments in a
broad range of legal disputes.156 Thus, for example, the First Amendment has been
invoked by companies arguing against mandated disclosures to the SEC, by tattoo
parlors seeking to be shielded from health regulations, and by therapists seeking to
escape state regulation of scientifically unproven therapeutic methods.157 In the
absence of any meaningful standards for evaluating questions of First Amendment
coverage—and given the potentially all-encompassing scope of the term “speech”—
there is little to constrain courts from expanding the doctrine into nearly all aspects
of government regulation save their own self-restraint.
This effect is further magnified in compelled speech doctrine, simply from the
fact that in the modern regulatory state, we are constantly required to do things that
we may not want to do—and, of course, speech (in the dictionary sense) is an
essential component of nearly every aspect of social and commercial activity. Thus,
without any constraining principles or clear doctrinal tests to apply, there are no clear
reasons—apart from courts’ self-restraint—why compelled speech doctrine cannot,
under a broad conception of autonomy, extend First Amendment coverage to, for
example, run-of-the-mill professional malpractice cases, or drug labeling
requirements, or large swaths of securities laws.
2. The Tension Created by Traditional First Amendment Doctrine
In addition to putting increased pressure on the speech-conduct distinction, the
expansion of First Amendment coverage produces a significant disconnect with
traditional First Amendment doctrine.158 Traditional First Amendment doctrine was
not designed with a First Amendment of this broad scope, complexity, and variety in
mind. Rather—apart from the Court’s distinct treatment of commercial speech—the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is best characterized as, in effect, an
ideological speech First Amendment: one formulated and calibrated based upon the
theoretical justifications for, and the perceived value of, unfettered political speech,

demoted because of the government’s mistaken factual belief that he was engaging in political
activity, “the government’s reason for [the demotion] is what counts,” and “the employee is
entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment” whether or not he
actually engaged in such activity).
155. Schauer, supra note 125, at 1616–17.
156. See id. at 1633.
157. Id. at 1614.
158. I have written about this issue in greater detail in my previous work, upon which
portions of this section draw. See Han, supra note 33, at 400–14; Han, supra note 98, at 95–
108.
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or religious speech, or other speech on social issues. And because the foundations of
First Amendment doctrine were largely established in the 1960s and 1970s—before
the explosive expansion of the First Amendment beyond the confines of ideological
speech—the doctrine broadly presumes a First Amendment that is unitary and
universal rather than eclectic and piecemeal. This posture is encapsulated in the
singular cornerstone rule of First Amendment jurisprudence: that all content-based
restrictions on speech (save a few narrow exceptions) are subject to strict scrutiny.159
This fundamental disconnect between a legacy doctrine calibrated to ideological
speech and the highly expansive and eclectic First Amendment of today has produced
a significant degree of tension within the doctrine, which has undermined the
coherence and integrity of the broad doctrinal framework. To an increasing degree,
the traditional doctrine simply doesn’t fit with the novel speech contexts that courts
are confronting—that is to say, the established doctrine often produces results that
conflict with our intuitional judgments as to what seems fair or sensible or correct in
a given case. And as I’ve written about elsewhere, when this occurs, courts have
evinced a willingness to surreptitiously evade the formal doctrinal framework
through various forms of doctrinal distortion and evasion—distortions that serve to
add further complexity and instability to the doctrine.160
This tension has produced two diametrically opposed analytical modes within the
Court’s decisions. One analytical mode—which I will call the traditional mode—
adheres to the traditional view of First Amendment protection. It construes First
Amendment doctrine as largely unitary and universal in nature, and it assumes
stringent protection of all speech falling within the First Amendment’s coverage as
a matter of course, with only very narrow exceptions.161 It regards discretionary
balancing approaches to speech problems with great suspicion, deeming them
antithetical to First Amendment principles.162 It therefore favors bright-line rules

159. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws—
those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests.”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
160. See Han, supra note 98, at 95–108; Han, supra note 33, at 395–413. Thus, for
example, the Court introduced the universally criticized “secondary effects” doctrine purely
as a means of evading an intuitively dissonant application of strict scrutiny to zoning
restrictions on sexually oriented businesses. See supra note 52 and accompanying text
(discussing the Renton case). And more recently, the Court watered down the strict scrutiny
standard in order to uphold a Florida Bar rule that prohibited candidates in judicial elections
from personally soliciting campaign funds. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433
(2015); Han, supra note 33, at 402 (describing how the Williams-Yulee Court watered down
its application of strict scrutiny to something more akin to an intermediate scrutiny-style
balancing test).
161. See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–93 (2011) (emphasizing
the narrowness of any categorical exceptions to the general principle that the “government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content”).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (describing as “startling
and dangerous” the suggestion that First Amendment coverage should rest on a categorical
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over open-ended standards, and it regards the judicial creation of additional doctrinal
categories with suspicion.163 This analytical mode is reflected in many of the Court’s
most recent First Amendment cases, such as United States v. Stevens,164 United States
v. Alvarez,165 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,166 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona.167
The opposing analytical mode—which I will call the eclectic mode—regards
modern First Amendment doctrine as nuanced and segmented. It recognizes the
breadth and variety of problems presented under a more expansive view of the First
Amendment, and is therefore more amenable to openly balancing conflicting speech
values and harms anew when novel problems arise.168 As such, it is far more
amenable to creating new doctrinal categories, and although it may share some of the
traditional mode’s suspicion of judicial discretion as applied in speech cases, it
broadly regards such discretion as largely inevitable and often preferable to ill-fitting
legacy rules.169 This analytical mode is reflected in cases like Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,170 New York v. Ferber,171
Pickering v. Board of Education,172 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,173 all of which represent efforts by the Court to segment
and categorize discrete subsets of speech for distinct treatment.
To be sure, this tension has generally arisen in the more typical First Amendment
context of speech restrictions, and as Amar and Brownstein have noted, many of the
core components of traditional First Amendment doctrine do not apply cleanly to the
very different context of compelled speech.174 But Justice Thomas’s opinion in
NIFLA signals a move within the Court to increasingly tie compelled speech doctrine
to the traditional doctrine governing speech restrictions, thus importing into the
compelled speech context all of the destabilizing effects outlined above.
Indeed, Justice Thomas’s opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion read as
paradigmatic examples of the two disparate analytical modes described above.

balancing of speech value and harms).
163. See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 792 (stating that new categorical exceptions to the
general rule against content-based restrictions will not be recognized absent “persuasive
evidence that [the restriction] is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription”).
164. 559 U.S. at 460.
165. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
166. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
167. 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
168. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (observing that
the Court “afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression”).
169. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753–64 (1982) (articulating in detail the
Court’s reasons for carving out child pornography as a distinct category of low-value speech).
170. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
171. 458 U.S. at 747.
172. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
173. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
174. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 112, at 8–10 (discussing how foundational
aspects of speech restriction doctrine, such as forum doctrine and the establishment of a
hierarchy of speech based on value, do not fit comfortably within compelled speech doctrine).
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Justice Thomas started his opinion with the cornerstone rule that all content-based
restrictions on speech “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only
if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”175 By anchoring his analysis in this manner, he immediately signals his
adherence to the traditional analytical mode—treating this case similarly to a case
dealing with a speech restriction—and under this mode, the standard analytical path
is clear. Speech, writ large, is generally to be treated as a single category,176 and as a
categorical matter, any content-based restriction on speech is subject to strict scrutiny
(which nearly inevitably means that it will be struck down). Thus, because the
licensed notice was content based, it must be struck down, barring exceptional
circumstances.177
Although Justice Thomas’s actual analysis was more nuanced than this, this
framing of the issue—and the rhetoric used throughout his analysis—makes clear
that the outcome is effectively a fait accompli. Justice Thomas spent a significant
portion of the opinion rebutting the argument that the licensed notice ought to
constitute professional speech subject to a less onerous standard of review,
emphasizing the Court’s broad “reluctan[ce] to ‘exempt a category of speech from
the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions.’”178 He framed the professional
speech argument as an argument for an anomaly to standard practice—an
“exempt[ion] from ordinary First Amendment principles.”179 And he all but
concluded that professional speech does not constitute a separate category of speech
subject to special doctrinal treatment, although he ultimately stopped short of
definitively foreclosing the possibility of such a category.180
Justice Breyer’s dissent, on the other hand, represented a paradigmatic example
of the eclectic mode of analysis. He started his analysis by immediately reframing
the case in direct opposition to Justice Thomas’s traditional framing. Rather than
premising his analysis on the categorical rule that all content-based restrictions on
speech are presumptively unconstitutional, he observed that “much, perhaps most,
human behavior takes place through speech and . . . much, perhaps most, law
regulates that speech in terms of its content.”181 Thus, in his view, the majority’s
broad approach “threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of
much, perhaps most, government regulation.”182 Framed in this manner, Justice

175. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015)).
176. See id. at 2372 (“This Court has ‘been reluctant to mark off new categories of speech
for diminished constitutional protection.’” (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996))).
177. See id. at 2371 (“The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech.”); id. at
2372 (“This Court’s precedents do not permit governments to impose content-based
restrictions on speech without ‘persuasive evidence of a long (if heretofore unrecognized)
tradition’ to that effect.” (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012))).
178. Id. at 2372 (quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722).
179. Id. at 2375.
180. See id. (stating that the licensed notice would fail even under an intermediate scrutiny
standard).
181. Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2380–83.
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Breyer emphasized the need for identifying and recognizing categorical differences
within the realm of content-based speech regulations: mandatory disclosures
regarding purely factual matters such as the licensed notice are fundamentally
different than requiring a student to salute the flag, as they are more akin to
unproblematic economic and social legislation.183
It therefore appears that to an increasing extent, the doctrinal instability that has
built up within the context of speech restrictions is being absorbed into compelled
speech doctrine as well. And this instability suggests that—just as in the speech
restriction context—the Court has the capacity to fluidly oscillate between each
mode of analysis on a case-by-case basis, as it can plausibly connect its analysis to
two distinct but divergent lines of cases depending on the desired result. Nearly every
state-mandated speech compulsion can, of course, be regarded as content-based in
nature. If the Court is inclined to strike it down, it merely need adhere to the
traditional mode of analysis anchored by the broad rule against content-based
restrictions, with all of its preset rhetorical flourishes. On the other hand, if it is
inclined to uphold it, it merely need to tie it to the many cases recognizing the
complexity of First Amendment doctrine and identifying and creating new speech
categories. This further compromises the doctrinal framework’s capacity to
meaningfully constrain courts’ decision-making.
III. SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE
So what can be done to counteract this doctrinal fluidity within compelled speech
doctrine? The most direct solution might be for the Court to fully embrace a singular,
robust theoretical basis for speech protection, which would cure many of the
maladies of the present doctrine at the root. The candidate theory most often
proposed for this role is the promotion of democratic self-governance or public
discourse. Versions of this argument have long been made within the academic
literature184 and continue to be made up to the present day.185
If First Amendment doctrine is tethered to this narrower and more stable
theoretical footing, many of the potentially incoherent and inconsistent features of
compelled speech doctrine fade away. A compelled speech doctrine premised solely
on democratic self-governance would mean a far stricter focus on ideological
speech—that is, speech on issues of public concern such as politics, religion, culture,
and so forth. If applied in a sufficiently narrow manner, this might mean that the
Court would simply get out of the business of imposing First Amendment scrutiny
on matters outside of this realm; the First Amendment may have little or nothing to
say regarding, for example, mandatory factual disclosures in commercial advertising
or the provision of professional services.186 Rooting the doctrine upon a singular,

183. See id.
184. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 103; Bork, supra note 120.
185. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 108, at 843; James Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491
(2011).
186. This might depend on both the context and content of the required disclosures. See
Corbin, supra note 15, at 1301–04 (distinguishing between compelled factual disclosures
meant to inform and those meant to persuade).
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definitive theoretical footing would afford the Court a more stable basis upon which
to craft a more robust speech-conduct distinction, and it would limit the coverage of
the First Amendment to a more manageable and coherent scope—one more
amenable to broad, unitary rules that apply across the board.
This solution, however, is utterly unrealistic, primarily because it runs squarely
against the prevailing popular and judicial conception of First Amendment coverage
as it stands today—and as noted above, First Amendment doctrine is an area where
intuition tends to lead to doctrine rather than vice versa.187 Many would likely bristle
at the suggestion that, for example, regulations of artistic speech or ideological
speech compulsions (at least when they are not attributable to the speaker)188 fall
completely outside of First Amendment coverage. And although some scholars have
argued for an expansive version of the democratic self-governance rationale that
would include a wider array of speech within First Amendment coverage, this sort
of expansion threatens to undermine the whole purpose of adopting a singular and
robust First Amendment theory, as it impairs the theory’s capacity to meaningfully
constrain the First Amendment’s coverage in a coherent manner.189
Indeed, given that the Court’s recent tendency has been to expand the scope of
the First Amendment to an ever-wider range of eclectic communicative contexts, it
is implausible that a contraction of the doctrine to a more manageable and
theoretically coherent scope is on the horizon. For better or worse, we have embraced
a vision of the First Amendment that is expansive, messy, and theoretically diverse.
Our First Amendment doesn’t care only about democratic self-governance—it also
cares about speaker and listener autonomy, the pursuit of truth, and the dangers of
state paternalism in public discourse. As Post has observed, “our social life is simply
too diverse and rich to be compressed into any such single pattern” such as “truth-

187. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
188. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Conscience of the Baker: Religion and Compelled
Speech, 28 WM. & MARY BILL. RTS. J. 287, 308 (2019) (observing that “an instrumental,
democracy-enhancing explanation for pure compelled-speech claims simply makes no
sense”); Volokh, supra note 1, at 368 (observing that pure speech compulsions generally do
not implicate any of the instrumental rationales for protecting speech).
189. Many versions of the argument argue for the inclusion of, for example, artistic
expression to the extent that it aids the populace in public deliberation and self-governance.
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263
(“I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems,
because they will be called upon to vote.”). Such arguments, however, stretch the democratic
self-governance theory so thinly as to undermine that theory’s capacity to meaningfully
constrain the breadth of the First Amendment’s coverage. If categories of speech far afield of
ideological speech can nevertheless be regarded as protected because it contributes to a
person’s capacity to participate in self-governance, then the self-governance theory starts to
resemble an autonomy-based theory, with all of the maddening open-endedness and linedrawing problems inherent to such theories. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 120, at 26–27
(discussing the difficulties of drawing such lines and proposing that First Amendment
protection extend only to “the outer limits of political speech”); Eugene Volokh, The Trouble
with “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 567–68
(2011) (arguing that the “public discourse” limitation is “unsound” given “the difficulty of
defining the category”).
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seeking” or “democracy,” and “[i]t would be neither plausible nor desirable to make
it so.”190
If we can’t revamp the unstable theoretical foundations of the doctrine, then
perhaps we can hope for a change in the Court’s present culture to one more suited
to developing stronger, more holistically consistent doctrinal frameworks. Much of
the instability of the present doctrine can be attributed to the Court’s general
readiness to reverse, modify, or significantly expand or contract preexisting doctrines
whenever five votes can be mustered for the desired result. This is, of course, not the
recipe for a coherent and stable doctrinal framework. A robust doctrinal framework
cannot be constructed by focusing solely on each case as it comes—it must be
designed holistically, with care as to how any doctrinal adjustments fit with both
preexisting doctrine and other related areas of the doctrine.
So perhaps if the Court were to adopt this more holistic posture—that is, to place
relatively more weight on doctrinal consistency, predictability, and stability as
opposed to its intuitions of rightness or wrongness in individual cases—it would have
a far greater capacity to craft a more coherent and less fluid doctrinal framework.191
If we are being optimistic, perhaps a Court adopting this sort of highly deliberative
posture might even, over time, develop a robust system of lexical priority to the
various conflicting theories upon which First Amendment doctrine is built, thus
bringing some meaningful order to a scattershot doctrine.192
This solution, however, is similarly unrealistic. There are no indications that the
case-by-case, “five votes make right” culture of the Court will change anytime soon,
as indicated by cases like Janus.193 And to be fair to the Court, constructing broad,
comprehensive doctrinal frameworks that are highly complex yet internally coherent
and stable may not be a task for which judges are institutionally well equipped.
Supreme Court Justices are not (or, for some, are no longer) law professors; their job
is to resolve cases, not to theorize entire bodies of doctrine. They often lack the
luxuries of both time and specialization to do so—they are constantly confronted
with cases covering a broad range of substantive areas that must be resolved in a

190. Post, supra note 144, at 1272.
191. This is not to say, of course, that the doctrine must remain static; a doctrine that cannot
adapt to changing circumstances risks becoming obsolete, such that it either yields
increasingly nonsensical results or devolves into meaningless window dressing. See Han,
supra note 98, at 113. It is only to say that one of the great virtues of common law-style
development—which is the most apt description for what the Court does in First Amendment
analysis—is its incremental and deliberate nature, one that consistently prioritizes doctrinal
coherence and consistency even as it steers the doctrine in different directions.
192. Robert Post has observed that “theories of the First Amendment can be arranged
according to a ‘lexical priority,’” such that “[w]hen theories conflict with each other, courts
must decide the order in which theories should take precedence.” Post, supra note 111, at
2373. As Post notes, this approach would allow for some degree of order and coherence amidst
conflicting theoretical regimes. Id.
193. See Schauer, supra note 96, at 141 (“I suspect . . . that for some time to come, as it
has been for some time in the past, stare decisis will serve almost entirely as a rhetorical
weapon against opponents of what the wielder of the weapon believes to be the right result,
questions of stare decisis aside. Stare decisis will continue not to constrain, and accusations
of failure to adhere to stare decisis will continue to be part of the rhetorical arsenal of those
who agree with a past decision and lament its overturning.”).
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limited span of time, leaving them with limited capacity to theorize far beyond the
immediate doctrinal precincts of the present case. So what we are often left with is a
series of discrete decisions from which we must struggle to draw coherence, and it is
difficult to imagine some sort of massive cultural shift that would radically alter the
present reality.
So perhaps the theoretical morass underlying the doctrine and the Court’s constant
doctrinal oscillations enabled by a case-focused judicial culture suggest that we
ought not hold out much hope that the Court will ever construct a fully coherent,
stable, and elegant compelled speech doctrine. Perhaps the scope of the modern First
Amendment is so sprawling and messy—and the Court’s case-by-case, winner-takeall mentality so intractable—that doctrinal fluidity should be understood as the norm
rather than the exception.
This is not to say that the entirety of the doctrine is doomed to incoherence,
malleability, and unpredictability. There is likely little dispute, for example, that a
pure ideological speech compulsion like that in Barnette is unconstitutional or that
the typical disclosures required under informed consent principles prior to medical
procedures are constitutional. But given the unstable theoretical foundations of the
doctrine and the Court’s approach to deciding cases, this sort of doctrinal stability
likely persists simply because the Court, legislatures, and society at large have
consistently, over time, come to share the same broad intuitions and value judgments
with respect to these particular First Amendment problems. It is likely this broadly
shared consensus—rather than any robust system or culture of doctrinal constraint—
that drives coherence and stability within First Amendment jurisprudence.
It therefore may be inevitable that highly contested areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence represent merely ideological and philosophical battlegrounds in which
the doctrine, by itself, holds little actual persuasive or justificatory force. Rather, the
surface complexity of the doctrine cloaks its problematic fluidity—its capacity to
shift, adjust, expand, or contract to accommodate a wide range of divergent results.
Thus, there may ultimately be very little to prevent a majority of the Court from
rapidly and radically transforming the coverage and protection of the First
Amendment as it pleases, apart from its own self-restraint. And this represents a
special concern within compelled speech doctrine, particularly amidst the
longstanding debate over the specter of First Amendment Lochnerism—the use of
an expansive First Amendment as an engine for effecting a broad deregulatory
agenda.194 Mandatory disclosures of all kinds are deeply entrenched within the
structure of the modern regulatory state,195 yet the murky theoretical and doctrinal
framework of the First Amendment can ultimately do little to constrain a willing
Court from radically upending this structure.

194. This issue has long been discussed by academic commentators, but the discussion has
greatly intensified in recent years. See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN YEARS 381–93 (1997); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial
Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2586 (2008); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of
First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016); Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016); Armijo, supra note 65; Genevieve Lakier, The First
Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241 (2020).
195. See, e.g., NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380–81 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing the wide range of disclosure laws).
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So perhaps the sobering conclusion is that there is not much that can realistically
be done to fix the problem of doctrinal fluidity in compelled speech doctrine. If that’s
the case, then perhaps the next best thing that we can hope for is a Court that
approaches cases in an analytically transparent manner—a manner that lays bare the
fundamental intuitions and value judgments upon which it is actually basing its
decisions rather than obscuring them behind complex and malleable doctrines. Such
an approach would, at the very least, allow courts—and society at large—to discuss
and debate these fundamental questions openly196 rather than through a doctrinal
façade that may serve more as post-hoc justification rather than as a means of actually
constraining and channeling the Court’s decision-making.
To frame this in different terms, perhaps the Court should approach First
Amendment doctrine in the same manner that common law courts approach
negligence doctrine. As discussed above, this would be consistent with the essential
nature of First Amendment doctrine; given the sparsity of the text and history of the
Free Speech Clause and its apparently broad mandate, First Amendment doctrine—
like negligence doctrine—has been built brick by brick, through common law-style
development. And crafting First Amendment doctrine poses the same fundamental
challenges as crafting negligence doctrine: both are undergirded by murky theoretical
foundations,197 and both represent an attempt to impose some order and coherence
upon a near-infinite range of possible factual circumstances potentially covered by
the doctrine.
Negligence determinations reached by common law courts broadly and openly
reflect the values and intuitions of the particular community in determining

196. As Robert Post has observed, “constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical
relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.” Robert
C. Post, Foreword; Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
197. Like in the First Amendment context, there is a long-running and perpetually unsettled
debate regarding the theoretical foundations of tort law. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1801, 1802–11 (1997) (describing this conflict amongst tort theorists). Some have argued that
the imposition of tort law is premised on corrective justice principles—the “simple and
elegant” idea that “when one person has been wrongfully injured by another, the injurer must
make the injured party whole.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 695 (2003). See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992);
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). Some have argued that tort law should
be premised on a concept of civil recourse—“the principle that plaintiffs who have been
wronged are entitled to some avenue of civil recourse against the tortfeasor who wronged
them.” Zipursky, supra, at 699. And some have argued for an instrumental vision of tort law—
that is, conceptualizing it as a means of incentivizing actors to behave in socially optimal ways.
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987).
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appropriate standards of care,198 crafting the dimensions of causation,199 and so forth.
Given that the entire doctrine is centered around a singular, open-ended standard—
how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances200—cases tend to be
analyzed and decided in a direct, pragmatic, and unvarnished manner, with
conflicting conceptions of fundamental values and social norms coming to the
fore.201 One might characterize the common law of negligence as an open-ended,
continuous conversation between courts of different eras and cultural contexts
regarding the abstract notion of a standard of care that necessarily shifts, expands,
and contracts in different contexts.202
On the face of things, it may seem incredibly unwise to approach First
Amendment doctrine in the same manner. After all, one of the consistent themes
within First Amendment jurisprudence is a deep skepticism of courts integrating their
own value judgments in delineating the boundaries of speech protection. Chief
Justice Roberts, for example, characterized such approaches as “startling and
dangerous,” given the risk that courts’ exercise of discretion would jeopardize the
principle of content neutrality at the heart of First Amendment doctrine.203 As a
result, there is a heightened tendency for the Court, in First Amendment cases, to
frame things in as “law-like” a manner as possible—to craft its analyses like lawyers
craft briefs, where dispassionate application of the doctrine inevitably leads to the
stated conclusion.204 It may therefore seem inappropriate for the Court to openly

198. See, e.g., Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1325
(2017) (“Tort has historically served as a means of determining community norms,
encouraging observance of those norms to enhance private cooperation, and stigmatizing those
who deviate.”).
199. See, e.g., Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252, 256 n.6 (Tenn.
1997) (“Proximate or legal cause is a policy decision made by the legislature or the courts to
deny liability for otherwise actionable conduct based on considerations of logic, common
sense, policy, precedent, and ‘our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice
demands or of what is administratively possible and convenient.’”).
200. See Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.) (“[W]e ought rather
to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary
prudence would observe.”).
201. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1548 (2010) (observing that the common law
“can at once acknowledge the incommensurability of the various values involved and strive to
accommodate them institutionally,” accomplishing this over a span of “centuries . . . through
a process of practical reasoning”).
202. See, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 116 (1988) (observing that
the law of negligence “seeks to permit the infusion of community values and their adjustment
over place and time”).
203. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits. . . . Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to
revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”).
204. See Han, supra note 98, at 95–105 (describing the Court’s tendency in First
Amendment cases to distort doctrine in order to craft formally plausible justifications in cases
where application of the existing doctrine would otherwise yield a dissonant result).
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debate underlying values and theories in the same manner as common law courts
deciding negligence cases.
Yet the present instability of First Amendment doctrine—rooted in its lack of a
stable theoretical foundation and the prioritization of case-by-case rightness over
doctrinal coherence—means that these sorts of conflicting value judgments and
intuitions are often the actual driving force behind the Court’s decisions. Thus, if
there is to be any hope of theoretical and doctrinal coherence emerging from the
current morass, it will likely be accomplished only through the establishment of
broad cultural consensus—between courts, legislatures, and society at large—
regarding fundamental speech values and how they interact with government
prerogatives.205 Such consensus, if it is achievable, will more likely arise within the
sort of open dialogue that is spurred by forthright and transparent acknowledgement,
rather than obfuscation, of the underlying intuitional and value-based differences
driving the Court’s varying decisions206—the sort of frank, foundational discussion
that is de rigueur in the negligence context. And even if it is unrealistic to expect that
this sort of consensus will ever be achievable, such an approach would at least bring
these sorts of conflicting fundamental judgments to the fore, rather than obscure them
behind a doctrinal façade.
Engendering this sort of analytical transparency rests on both doctrinal and nondoctrinal factors. Certain doctrinal frameworks are, by nature, more conducive to
encouraging this sort of open dialogue regarding first principles. Here, the broad
design of negligence doctrine is instructive. As noted above, negligence doctrine is
centered around a simple, open-ended standard: how a reasonable person would act
under the circumstances.207 The indeterminacy and open-endedness of this standard
necessarily requires courts to delve directly into the sorts of broad value judgments
and intuitions that drive their analyses. And while, in the course of its common-law
development, negligence doctrine has also incorporated varying degrees of
complexity to effect greater precision with respect to specific problems,208 it has
nevertheless consistently retained its focus on this singular standard.
Certain aspects of First Amendment doctrine might therefore benefit from an
incremental move towards what one might call “de-codification”: eschewing
complex, rule-like approaches in favor of simpler, open-ended approaches.
Although, as noted above, complexity can strengthen doctrine by introducing greater
precision and constraint, it can also serve to distance courts’ analyses from the

205. As Post has observed, “constitutional law could not plausibly proceed without
incorporating the values and beliefs of nonjudicial actors”; thus, “constitutional law will be as
dynamic and as contested as the cultural values and beliefs that inevitably form part of the
substance of constitutional law.” Post, supra note 196, at 10.
206. See Han, supra note 33, at 372–79 (observing that the value of analytical transparency
“track[s] the traditional First Amendment principle that open deliberation is both the best
means of arriving at truth and an essential requirement for making reasoned collective
decisions”).
207. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
208. For example, distinct duty standards apply to those acting in an emergency situation,
to landowners or occupiers of land, to those with physical disabilities, to professionals, to
children, and so on. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW
OF TORTS §§ 118–131, at 280–309 (2d ed. 2001).
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underlying intuitional, theoretical, and value-based judgments driving the
doctrine.209 And when the doctrine becomes so fluid and unstable as to fail in its
ability to constrain, its capacity to obscure rather than illuminate the fundamental
drivers of the analysis comes with little benefit other than an appearance of law-like
constraint. Thus, to the extent that many of the Court’s decisions actually come down
to conflicting fundamental judgments—judgments as why speech should be
protected, or the appropriate weight to be given to government interests, or the
particular limits of autonomy-based considerations—it should move towards
simpler, more standard-like doctrinal approaches that push courts to articulate these
judgments in a deeper and more open manner.210
The exact manner by which the complexity of the current doctrinal framework
might realistically be pared down is beyond the scope of this Article. But one target
for this sort of incremental de-codification might be the increasingly unstable body
of doctrine surrounding content-based speech restrictions.
As discussed above, the longstanding First Amendment rule is that all contentbased restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny (and thus near-automatic
invalidation), save a few narrow exceptions. This highly speech-protective rule has
increasingly proved to be a poor fit for the modern First Amendment, given the broad
expansion of the First Amendment’s coverage to a wide variety of speech beyond
core ideological speech.211 The Court has therefore developed an increasingly
intricate set of rules to cope with this growing disconnect—rules that have often been
poorly theorized, murky, and inconsistent. For example, the Court has instituted
hollow doctrinal distinctions like the secondary effects doctrine;212 it has
occasionally applied the nebulous “exacting scrutiny” standard of review, the
meaning of which is opaque and inconsistent;213 and it has applied established
standards of review with varying stringency in different cases, for obscure reasons
or no reason at all.214 Such complexity has done little to meaningfully constrain the

209. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term – Foreword: Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 67 (1992) (“[S]tandards make visible and
accountable the inevitable weighing process that rules obscure.”).
210. See Han, supra note 33, at 371–79.
211. See supra notes 124–38 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
213. At times, the Court has appeared to use this phrase as a synonym for strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (plurality opinion)
(“Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may regulate protected speech only if such
regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest.”). At other times, however, the term seems to denote a standard of review
more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but less stringent than strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Janus
v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mut. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018); Doe
No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (citations omitted) (stating that “exacting scrutiny”
requires “a ‘substantial relation’ between the [regulation] and a ‘sufficiently important’
governmental interest”). As I’ve previously observed, it’s difficult to see how courts could
meaningfully distinguish intermediate scrutiny from “exacting” (but not strict) scrutiny. David
S. Han, Categorizing Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 613, 635 n.103 (2018).
214. See Han, supra note 33, at 402–04 (describing the Court’s application of a clearly
watered-down version of strict scrutiny in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar and Burson v.
Freeman).
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Court’s decision-making, and it has worked more to confuse and obfuscate rather
than illuminate the values and judgments underlying the Court’s decisions.215
Greater analytical transparency might therefore be achieved by an incremental
move away from the traditional approach—and the doctrines that have developed
around it—towards more open-ended balancing approaches. In doctrinal terms, this
might mean a far more expansive adoption of intermediate scrutiny. Under
intermediate scrutiny, the outcome is not effectively preordained by the initial
designation of the standard of review, which has been the source of so much
messiness within traditional First Amendment doctrine. Rather, intermediate
scrutiny “establishes a level playing field upon which conflicting state and private
interests do battle.”216 It “forces courts to openly confront and grapple with
foundational questions and assumptions regarding the value of the rights at stake and
the government's regulatory interests, as it leaves courts with little doctrine to hide
behind.”217
Thus, for example, the Court might designate intermediate scrutiny, rather than
strict scrutiny, as the broad default standard of review for First Amendment
problems, subject to categorical exceptions where either strict scrutiny or a highly
deferential standard of review might apply.218 Under this approach, the open-ended
intermediate scrutiny standard—which requires the Court to forthrightly balance
individual speech interests and state regulatory interests without a thumb on the
scale—would represent the core rule governing a wide range of First Amendment
problems, akin to the reasonable person standard in negligence law. This approach
would spur courts to anchor their analyses upon the value judgments and intuitions
actually driving First Amendment doctrine, producing forthright, transparent debate.
Analytical transparency does not rest solely on the underlying doctrinal
framework. It also rests on how deeply courts choose to conduct their analyses.
Regardless of the doctrinal framework, courts may choose to analyze issues in a
shallow manner, based on a surface application of formal doctrine rather than a
deeper examination of the values and theories underlying the doctrine. Take, for
example, the NIFLA Court’s analysis of the licensed notice. In distinguishing the
licensed notice from the mandated disclosure upheld in Casey, the Court merely
highlighted a single factual difference between the two cases: in Casey, the mandated
disclosure accompanied a discrete medical procedure (abortion), whereas in NIFLA,
the licensed notice was “not tied to a [medical] procedure at all.”219 It gave little
explanation as to why this distinction was so vital; it provided no grounding of its
analysis to the underlying values surrounding the First Amendment or the
government’s regulatory prerogatives; and it provided no meaningful framework as
to how courts are to distinguish protected speech from unprotected conduct.220 This

215. See id. at 414.
216. Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2808 (2005).
217. Han, supra note 33, at 400.
218. See Han, supra note 98 (proposing and discussing such an approach in detail).
219. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373–74 (2018).
220. See id. at 2373 (stating only that “the line between speech and conduct” is “difficult”
to draw but “long familiar to the bar”).
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sort of shallow approach fails to advance any meaningful debate upon which some
degree of doctrinal stability might be established.
By contrast, the Court’s opinion in Janus delved into the fundamental values,
judgments, and intuitions at the heart of the dispute. It anchored its analysis in a
detailed discussion of the First Amendment values implicated by the imposition of
agency fees, arguing why these values demand a reexamination of Abood.221 The
Court also delved into the underlying purpose and scope of the Pickering test in
rejecting the dissent’s application of that test to the case at hand; among other things,
the Court articulated in detail why the speech in question constituted the sort of
speech on matters of public concern that lies at the heart of First Amendment
protection.222 This direct articulation of the values and intuitions driving the Court’s
judgment allows for the sort of open and robust dialogue that lays bare the
fundamental differences between both sides223—one that may spur an ongoing
deliberative process within which, over time, consensus might start to develop.
Thus, in the absence of any realistic solution to the problem of doctrinal fluidity
in compelled speech doctrine (and First Amendment doctrine in general), perhaps
the next best thing would be for the Court to embrace more open and transparent
approaches to difficult First Amendment problems, as a matter of both doctrinal
design and analytical depth. Whether such a shift can realistically be expected is a
separate question that is difficult to answer in the abstract. At the very least, however,
a broad preference for such approaches to First Amendment problems is already
represented amongst some members of the Court,224 such that an incremental shift in
this direction may be plausible as the Court’s membership and judicial philosophies
continue to evolve.

221. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mut. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2463–69 (2018)
222. Id. at 2472–78.
223. See id. at 2491–97 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (challenging the value judgments and
assumptions underlying the majority’s treatment of Pickering).
224. Justice Breyer has long advocated for pragmatic, open-ended, proportionality-based
approaches to difficult First Amendment problems, premised on the general question of
whether a regulation “works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730–31 (2012) (rejecting a “strict categorical analysis”
and endorsing a more open-ended, proportionality-based approach) (Breyer, J. concurring);
see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). And in
his analyses, he has consistently sought to articulate and wrestle with the conflicting values,
judgments, and principles underlying First Amendment problems rather than simply rely on
the rote application of preexisting rules. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361, 2381–83 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 176–79 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Kagan has evinced a similar penchant for open, pragmatic
reasoning in the First Amendment context. For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, she
challenged the majority’s rigid application of the rule against content-based speech restrictions
in a case dealing with a municipality’s sign ordinance. In doing so, she first elucidated the
theoretical rationales underlying the rule, then argued that “[w]e can administer our contentregulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way
implicate its intended function.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 183 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The instability and doctrinal fluidity within compelled speech doctrine is merely
a microcosm of the present state of First Amendment doctrine as a whole. The First
Amendment of today is a far cry from the relatively narrow, ideological speechfocused First Amendment around which the cornerstone doctrines of First
Amendment jurisprudence were originally constructed. Today’s First Amendment is
messy, bloated, and unwieldy, encompassing a morass of different doctrines
governing a wide variety of disparate communicative and regulatory contexts. It has
expanded to cover broad swaths of speech extending far beyond the traditional
ideological speech context. It covers a wide range of regulatory contexts beyond
direct speech restrictions, such as mandatory regulatory disclosures,225 compelled
subsidies of speech,226 and regulations of expressive associations.227 And it attempts
to ground all of this complexity on an assortment of often conflicting theoretical
rationales for protecting speech—an unstable foundation that does little to unify and
guide the doctrine in any meaningful way.
This profusion of messiness and fluidity within First Amendment jurisprudence
is ultimately a natural outgrowth of the expansive First Amendment that we have
chosen to adopt. It is far easier to craft a coherent and stable doctrinal framework—
one that is predictable, consistent, and effectively channels and constrains courts’
decision-making—with respect to a narrower First Amendment, such as one
concerned solely with direct government restrictions on ideological speech. And it is
similarly easier to build a doctrinal framework around a robust, singular theory of
speech protection—one that can provide meaningful guidance in doctrinal
development—rather than the theoretically diverse First Amendment of today. The
complexity, fluidity, and inconsistency in our First Amendment doctrine is simply
the price that we pay for our vision of a powerful, eclectic, and far-reaching First
Amendment. Thus, if we wish to adhere to this expansive vision of the First
Amendment, we may need to temper any hopes for an elegant, fully unified,
coherent, and stable doctrinal framework. And in the absence of this sort of robust
framework, encouraging pragmatic and transparent doctrinal development through
open deliberation and debate—which highlights rather than obscures the contested
value judgments and intuitions actually driving the results—is perhaps the best that
we can do.

225. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
226. See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
227. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 82

5/5/22 2:58 PM

